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Abstract
This paper presents a rationale for hybrid public-private capital structures in public
utilities. The public sector can borrow money cheaper, while private investors can spawn
life-cycle cost savings. When investment vehicles enable the internalization of the financial
advantage of the public sector and the managerial advantage of the private sector, a
Pareto-efficient capital structure is achieved with both the public and private parties as
shareholders. I show how different knowledge transfer schemes determine the optimal
shareholding structure for the utility company.
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Public agents have limited financial resources to face large (and increasing) quality stan-
dards. A key justification for pursuing public-private partnerships (PPP) are lower costs than
in solely private investments and higher quality than in the solely public provision of public
goods (Vaillancourt-Rosenau 2000), due to the public agent’s lower cost of capital (London
Energy Partnership, 2007; (Grout 2003), and the investor’s managerial skills (Linder 1999)
and industry-specific know-how (Hennart 1988), particularly with complex goods (Saussier,
Staropoli, and Yvrande-Billon 2009). PPPs can increase quality to meet higher standards at
the same level of capital expenditures or - keeping quality standards constant - free resources
for the provision of other public goods.
The World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects Database provides
information on more than 4,000 infrastructure projects in developing countries dating from
1984 to 2010. In 713 PPP water projects amounting total investments of 41 billion US dollars,
prevailingly in East Asia-Pacific and Latin America-Caribbean regions (see Table 1, Panel A),
private ownership averages 87% (see Panel B). Interestingly, one quarter of all PPPs present
hybrid public-private capital structures with private ownership between 20% and 80% (see
Panel C).
Public-private hybrids are a common governance practice in Western countries. Table 2
depicts examples of PPPs with mixed public-private capital structures in the utilities sector
in various European countries 1. Referring to government-sponsored enterprises, Jaffee and
Quigley (2009) sustain that “there is little reason to presume that the evolution of these
enterprises represented the best method of providing services”. Thus the question is under
which conditions PPPs with mixed public-private capital can provide a more efficient gover-
nance structure than solely public or entirely private. This paper presents a simple model to
assess the efficiency of public-private capital structures.
PPPs are often undertaken by joint venture companies or special purpose vehicles (SPV)
with equity contributed by private investors and the public sector(European Commission and
Others 2004; Corbacho and Schwartz 2008; Weber and Alfen 2010; Schaeffer and Loveridge
2002. The share in equity of the SPV is reflected in the shareholders’ voting power and
management involvement. To be compelling, the shareholding structure of the PPP-SPV
1 Weber and Alfen (2010) show that two out of the ten largest international airports by passengers world-
wide (Paris CDG and Frankfurt) have a mixed public-private ownership structure. See also, e.g., European
Commission and Others (2004) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006).
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should secure the interest of both types of shareholders by providing room for public financing
and private sector managerial discretion.
The rationale for hybrid solutions presented in this paper is similar to Rangan, Samii, and
Van Wassenhove’s (2006), but differs in the drivers. Efficient financing of public investments
by the private sector requires that the higher financing cost of the private sector be offset by
life-cycle cost savings due to the transfer of skills and know-how from the private sector.
The main thrust of the paper is that it may be optimal for the public agent to become
a shareholder in public utilities SPV. In markets with a long and reliable tradition of public
procurement, such a statement sounds counterintuitive2. The existence of market failures,
however, especially in the case of transition and emerging economies, justifies the govern-
ment’s involvement in the SPV to correct market failures which result in the inability of the
marketplace to provide public goods (Jevcˇa´k and Keereman 2008; Tandberg 2008).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the literature
related to mixed public-private partnerships. Section 2 introduces the premises on the public
sector’s financial advantage and private sector’s managerial advantage. Section 3 outlines the
relationships between expected quality, required investments in infrastructure, and life-cycle
costs. Section 4 presents a discrete and a continuous model of skills transfer to describe the
optimal public-private capital structure in PPPs for the provision of public utilities infras-
tructure. Section 5 concludes with policy advice.
1 Related Literature
The first public-private cooperation sets were concessions. Mixed public-private ownership is
rather a novel concept.3 In Linder’s (1999) taxonomy of public-private partnerships, hybrid
governance structures are defined as ‘risk-shifting’ and ‘power-sharing’ PPPs. Weber and
Alfen (2010) refer to these solutions as ‘horizontal’ or ‘institutional’ PPPs (as opposed to
‘vertical’ or ‘contractual’ PPPs). Schaeffer and Loveridge (2002) state that public and the
private sectors have complementary powers and thus each can help the other accomplish
things that may otherwise not be feasible.
2 This paper is not intended to advocate government intervention in private companies. Nonetheless,
recent bailouts by governments worldwide during the period 2008-2010 have made the idea of governments
taking a stake in private businesses less outrageous.
3 A concise historic background of PPP can be found in Grimsey and Lewis (2004, 2005).
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The literature on financing public investments by private capital compares higher capital
expenditures for public financing with the higher availability payments for private financing
(Irwin 2008)4. Most scholars (Grout 1997, 2003; Hart 2003; Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997)
focus on the dichotomy whether a public agency should provide a service in-house or contract
out provision.
The European Commission and Others (2004) provides examples of mixed public-private
ownership and risk sharing. Very few scholars have taken account of cost drivers continuum
between the public and private sectors and implications for the governance structure. Beato
and Vives (1996) acknowledge that “mixed cases share features of the pure cases”, and there-
fore “they may be evaluated by using the relative participation of final consumers and the
public agency in the private firm’s revenues”. Gerrard (2001) points out mixed public and pri-
vate ownership in water supply utilities, and Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue (2006)
give two examples of ‘semi-private’ ownership of public utilities. Schwartz, Corbacho, and
Funke (2008) describe the pros and cons of mixed public-private structures. Rangan, Samii,
and Van Wassenhove (2006) set the necessary conditions for economic opportunity realization
of mixed public-private partnerships based on transaction cost economics and externalities
theory. Gazley, Chang, and Bingham (2010) underline the relevancy of a stakeholder outlook
on governance to the context of public-private partnerships because of its ‘systems-centered’
perspective on how constituent interests are represented. Ruf´ın and Rivera-Santos (2012)
compare PPPs with business-to-business alliances. They predict that PPPs will avoid equity
structures and will rely, instead, on less complete and more complex alliance contracts, which
contrasts with substantial empirical evidence. Cruz and Marques (2012) discuss the practi-
calities of governance of mixed ownership structures and, on the basis of in-depth cross-sector
case studies, argue that mixed companies lead to poor welfare outcomes due to complex whole
life-cycle management. Gautier and Yvrande-Billon (2013) present regulation type (cost-plus
vs. fixed price) and ownership structure (private vs. mixed) efficiency outcomes in French
urban public transportation and show that a mixed firm regulated by a cost-plus contract is
the least efficient modality.
4 For the so-called Public Sector Comparator (PSC) and Value for Money (VfM) methodologies, see
Broadbent and Laughlin (2003) and HM Treasury (2003).
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2 Public Financial Advantage and Private Managerial Advan-
tage
In this section I analyze the conditions for Pareto-efficient public-private financing of infras-
tructure. Pareto efficiency refers here to achieving the same quality of service at a lower
cost or better quality at the same cost for a PPP compared to solely government and solely
private investments.
Domestic financial markets of emerging economies are not deep and efficient enough
to provide reasonably priced capital to finance large public projects. On the one hand,
governments aiming at infrastructure development have to use savings from the external
sector. Current account deficits of Central and Eastern European countries in the last decade
confirm this observation. On the other hand, the conservative approach to risk evaluation
by foreign investors leads to an additional premium to cover an excess risk for uncertainty.
The public sector’s participation provides the necessary certainty to attract foreign capital
and offset the additional premium, and can make investment in infrastructure an interesting
business case. Public participation does not correct all market failures, but it reduces their
impact.
The rationale behind public shareholding in the SPV points also to the principal-agent
theory. In a PPP, the public and private sectors have conflicting interests regarding the
project’s cost and the quality of the public good delivered. Under most legislative systems,
shareholders have more control over the company’s activities than its contractors. Therefore,
governments seeking high-quality and fairly-priced public goods would have better control
over the project as shareholders. Again, the need for better internal control of quality and
prices is more important in emerging and transition markets, where legal regulations are not
entrenched strongly enough.
Cost of Public Capital
Prestigious economists (Samuelson 1964; Vickrey 1964; Solow 1965; Baumol 1968; Arrow
and Lind 1970), analyzing the social discount rate in the 1960’s and 1970’s, claimed that the
discount rate for public entities should be lower than for the private sector. Other leading
scholars (Hirshleifer 1964; Diamond 1967; Bailey and Jensen 1972; Dreze 1974; Kay 1993;
Brealey, Cooper, and Habib 1997; Klein 1997) held that the social discount rate should be
higher than the plain public borrowing cost, equaling both public and private discount rates.
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They argued that the public sector’s lower borrowing cost does not reflect a more efficient
management of risk, but the fact that the public sector does not default and that it can levy
taxes to repay debt. These arguments are applicable to the general case of public borrowing
in a closed economy; they, however, should not apply to the PPPs in emerging and transition
markets for the following reasons:
• The effective PPP scheme assumes the transfer of risks from the public sector to the
private sector (Bondal 2005). Therefore, the public sector’s cost of borrowing does not
reflect the project’s risks, as these risks are transferred out of the public sector. As
the International Monetary Fund (2004) states, it is difficult to establish whether the
transfer of risk out of the public sector is proportional to the difference in funding cost,
but the public cost of lending is definitely lower.
• In case of investments which are not significant to the economy (low share in GDP),
the discount rate for the public sector should be lower than for the private sector,
because the public sector can better absorb and spread risks among a greater number
of individuals (Arrow and Lind 1970; Fisher 1973).
• Private companies cannot internalize all externalities and their return on investment
comes only from the project’s cash flows. Flemming and Mayer (1997) show that private
sector investments in public utilities depend on the policy applied in other sectors of
the economy and create externalities leading to inefficient piece-meal decision making,
when only the perspective of a single sector of the economy is taken into account.
• In the case of incomplete capital markets, investors and lenders are not able to protect
themselves in these markets against the risk connected with securities that are financing
the public or private investments and therefore apply various discount rates (Hirshleifer
1964; Bailey and Jensen 1972).
• Grout (2003) proved that even in a world without incomplete markets and distorting
taxation, it is appropriate to apply a higher discount rate for private entities than for
public ones. The argument is based on the differential in the beta (risk) for government
payments under a PPP and the beta of government expenditures under the normal
public provision of goods.
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• Lind (1990) suggests that the government’s long-term borrowing rate is a “good first
candidate” for long-run intergenerational problems and that “for most government
projects we should compute net benefits (from the project) using the government bor-
rowing rate as the discount rate” (Spackman 2004).
Moreover, the concept of the social discount rate is based on the social time preference.
It is justified to take into account a common social discount rate for projects financed in the
domestic market. It would be difficult for any government, however, to consider the social
discount rate of the external sector, which theoretically should be applied if projects are
financed from the savings of the external sector.
The two concepts: the cost of capital (i.e., a financial approach) and the social discount
rate (i.e., a general equilibrium approach) should not be equaled. I base my proposition
regarding the cost of capital on direct market evidence that the public sector can raise capital
cheaper than the private sector5 and, from these funds, it can finance different projects. I
concentrate on the cost of resources engaged and did not discuss the social cost of capital.
Whether public sector projects should be discounted at a lower rate than private sector
projects is a highly contentious issue.
The amount of literature supporting the lower cost of capital for the public sector (start-
ing from the Arrow-Lind theorem in 1970) is as large and strong as that supporting the
approach according to which public projects should be discounted at the same rate (see for
example: HM Treasury 2003; Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic 2008), irrespective of the source
of financing (see discussion in section 2.4 in Grout 2005). Writing in the 1980s on public
sector discount rates and their relation to private sector discount rates, Lind (1982) pointed
out that “the profession was no closer to agreement on the theory, on a procedure for com-
puting the discount rate, or on the rate itself than it was in 1966.” The evidence is that
the difference between the interest rates for governments and private investors is statistically
significant; however, whether public projects should be discounted at the same or a different
rate is not a positive, but a normative question.
5 See Table 3. Kosar (2008) and Jaffee and Quigley (2009) state that GSEs borrow money at significantly
lower interest rates than solely private peers because of the inferred government guarantee. In emerging
economies, the bond market is not liquid enough to provide continuous data. Moreover, most of municipal
and corporate bonds there are privately placed and their yields are not published. Moszoro (2005) support
the hypothesis of lower interest rates for public entities than for private corporations based on listed municipal
and corporate bonds in Poland.
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Life-Cycle Cost Savings
Empirical research carried out in the United Kingdom and in the United States shows that the
private sector can develop infrastructure cheaper than the public sector (Wright 1987; Viscusi,
Vernon, and Harrington 2000). Wallace and Junk (1970) even claim that the investment costs
of public enterprises are 40% higher than those of private enterprises.
On one hand, PPPs involve sizable structuring and transaction costs, and force gov-
ernments to develop expensive internal capacities: lawyers, engineers, and financial advisers
(Tandberg 2008; Corbacho and Schwartz 2008). Conversely, savings can be attributed to more
efficient project management by the private investor (Linder 1999), shortened construction
and development times (Ward and Chapman 1995; Saussier, Staropoli, and Yvrande-Billon
2009), higher cost of innovation efforts under private ownership of assets (Hart, Shleifer,
and Vishny 1997), and lower administrative expenditures and less bureaucracy (Starr 1988;
Goldsmith 1997). United Kingdom’s National Audit Office (NAO) reports on PPPs (Euro-
pean Investment Bank 2004; Bondal 2005) presented the following statistics confirming the
above-mentioned sources of savings:
(a) A report commissioned by the Treasury Taskforce found that the average percentage
estimated saving against the Public Sector Comparator in PFI projects was 17%.
(b) HM Treasury research of 61 Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects:
• 89% of projects were delivered on time or early;
• All PFI projects in the HM Treasury sample were delivered within public sector
budgets;
• No PFI project was found where the unitary charge had changed following contract
signature other than where user requirements changed;
• 77% of public sector managers stated that their project was meeting their initial
expectations.
(c) Four Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) road contracts appear likely to generate net
quantifiable savings of around £100 million (13%)
(d) Out of 98 projects surveyed by the NAO in 2001 on public authorities’ perceptions of
Value For Money:
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• 81% believed that PFI projects are achieving satisfactory or better Value For Money—
only 4% described Value For Money as ‘poor’;
• 75% of PFI projects were delivered on time or early, and in no case did the public
sector bear the cost of construction overruns, a significant improvement on previous
non-PFI experience.
(e) The contract for the Private sector Resource Initiative for the Management of the Estate,
a project comprising transfer of the Department of Social Security estate to the private
sector, is estimated to deliver savings of £560 million, 22%, over 20 years.
Capital expenditures are not always higher under the public sector’s governance (Ahadzi
and Bowles 2004). Vast evidence of cases of lower capital expenditures under private gover-
nance, however, deserves analysis for its implications in the organization of PPPs.
The mainstream PPP literature suggests that the key issues involved in the governance
structure are the bundling of the project’s construction and operation and efficient risk allo-
cation between the public agent and private investors (Rangan, Samii, and Van Wassenhove
2006), regardless of the capital structure. Contract bundling is not in contradiction to the
proposition of lower capital expenditures due to the private sector’s participation in the
SPV—it reinforces it. What the private sector does when bundling is a ‘package selling’ of:
construction, insurance, and financing for a lower price than when contracted independently
by the public sector. I sustain that when the private capital’s share is large enough, the ad-
vantages of this bundling may be realized because of the economic incentives for the private
investor (Hennart 1988).
When the private contractor only constructs the infrastructure without residual claims
(i.e., no shares in the SPV), it has no incentives to build cheaply, but to bid low to win
the tender. Where competition is low and the public sector does not have the resources to
organize repetitive tenders, it may happen that:
(a) There is price collusion or bid rigging (Buccirossi 2008; Laffont and Tirole 1993)
(b) After bidding low and winning the tender, the private contractor renegotiates the con-
tracts (see asymmetric collusion in Laffont and Tirole 1993).
(c) When public-private relations are ex ante less flexible and subject to ex post higher
accountability (Wang and Bunn 2004), the private contractor charges a higher price than
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in a private-to-private relational contract (Moszoro and Spiller 2014).
(d) While the question on the appropriate discount rate is normative, why knowledge transfer
requires private sector’s (partial) equity ownership in the project is a positive question
subject to the institutional and judicial environment. The corollary is that when a private
investor has an equity stake in the project, residual control rights are more properly
protected and the private investor has economic incentives to transfer managerial skills
and know-how to innovate in cost and quality (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997).
Hybrids public-private structures unveil severe governance problems. Cruz and Marques
(2012) present empirical evidence on mixed companies from Portugal and discuss the hin-
drances to achieve internal regulation and relational agreement along the life-cycle. Gautier
and Yvrande-Billon (2013) observe that, although mixed companies have a higher probability
of contract renewal, they present the least efficient outcome.
This paper presents first-best comparative statics and is not intended to vindicate mixed
ownership PPP. At the risk of oversimplifying, I model specific key drivers of PPP, namely:
cost of capital and managerial expertise as functions of continuous public-private ownership.
In particular institutional settings, the relevance of these drivers is subdued to governance,
contractual, and political constraints. In general, however, they do matter and hence should
be factored in.
3 Model Setup
Consider a partial equilibrium setup with a monopoly utilities provider - public, private, or
mixed - and a representative consumer.
The amount of capital expenditures on the utilities infrastructure is determined by the
required quality of the public goods or service supplied. Consider a newly formed SPV
that invests during the development phase and then operates the infrastructure based on a
two-part tariff: a fixed fee that covers investment outlays and a variable fee that covers the
variable cost of service (Coase 1946). This proposition requires that capital expenditures I(q)
necessary to satisfy demand at quality level q should be equal to the present value of fixed
fees f(q) paid to the SPV over the lifetime t of the infrastructure:
I(q) = f(q)
1− (1 + r)−t
r
(1)
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For a sufficiently long life of the project, this can be expressed as:
I(q) =
f(q)
r
(2)
The public sector’s discount rate rpu is lower than the private sector’s discount rate rpr.
Capital expenditures (without financial costs) for publicly executed projects are higher
by J(q)than capital expenditures for privately executed ones.
Finally, θ ∈ [0, 1] is the private investor’s share in the SPV.
4 Optimal Public-Private Capital Structures
In this section, I show how different know-how transfer schemes determine the optimal cap-
ital structure of the SPV. When the cost of capital is lower for public entities and capital
expenditures are lower for investment carried by private investors, it is possible to reach
the lowest total financial and development cost with mixed public and private shareholding
that enables the internalization of both the public sector’s cost of capital advantage and the
private sector’s managerial advantage.
Discrete Knowledge Transfer Scheme
Let us assume that the transfer of the private investor’s know-how - i.e., idiosyncratic
industry-specific knowledge and skills in infrastructure engineering, capital allocation, and
risk management (Rangan, Samii, and Van Wassenhove 2006) - to the SPV materializes when
the private share in the SPV achieves a minimum θ ≥ e 6. From equation 2, fixed fees for
mixed public-private financing is given by:
f(n) =
{
θ · I(q) · rpr + (1− θ) · [I(q) + J(q)] · rpu for θ < e
θ · I(q) · rpr + (1− θ) · I(q) · rpu for θ ≥ e
(3)
It remains discussable the extent to which cost saving and quality innovation effort is
intrinsic and exclusive to the private sector (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997). In the discrete
model, I assume that if the private investor holds residual control rights greater or equal to
a certain threshold e ∈ (0, 1), then cost-saving know-how transfer to the SPV is realized as
described by Eaton, Akbiyikli, Akintoye, and Beck (2009).
6 As Hennart (1988) points out, some knowledge types are firm-specific assets, i.e., they cannot be acquired
separately from the firm.
11
For θ ≥ e, mixed public-private ownership is superior to public ownership when:
θ · I(q) · rpr + (1− θ) · I(q) · rpu < [I(q) + J(q)] · rpu (4)
Solving for θ we obtain:
θ <
J(q)
I(q)
/(
rpr
rpu
− 1
)
(5)
Condition 5 shows that the project should be fully realized by the public sector if either
there are no savings from private know-how (i.e., J(q) = 0) or savings are relatively small
compared with the difference in financial costs.
Provided there is know-how transfer from the private to the public sector (θ ≥ e), PPP
(interior solution of inequality 5) is more efficient than entirely public or private financing
(boundary solutions) when:
θ · I(q) · rpr + (1− θ) · I(q) · rpu < min{I(q) · rpr; [I(q) + J(q)] · rpu} (6)
For I(q) · rpr < [I(q) + J(q)] · rpu:
θ · rpr + (1− θ) · rpu < rpr (7)
(1− θ)(rpu − rpr) < 0 (8)
with inequality 8 holding for every θ ∈ [e, 1).
For I(q) · rpr > [I(q) + J(q)] · rpu:
θ · I(q) · rpr + (1− θ) · I(q) · rpu < [I(q) + J(q)] · rpu
can be simplified to:
θ · rpr + (1− θ) · rpu − rpu <
J(q)
I(q)
rpu (9)
θ <
J(q)
I(q)
(
rpu
rpr − rpu
)
(10)
Condition 10 implies that the private investor’s share in the SPV is determined by the
relative savings from private know-how and the interest rate spread between the public and
private sectors.
Setting θ = 1, we obtain (rpr − rpu)/rpu < J(q)/I(q). Therefore, the private investor
should be the sole shareholder if relative savings on capital expenditures are bigger than the
relative spread between discount rates.
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Example 1:
The relationship presented in condition 10 can be used to present the following stylized
example. Let us assume savings J(q)/I(q) to equal 20%7, private sector interest rate
at 8.50% and interest rate of long-term loans for public sector entities at 7%. PPPs
would be efficient (in terms of a tradeoff between financial and development cost) when
θ < .2(.07/.015), i.e., when e ≤ θ < 93%. Assuming an increase in the spread between the
rates to 300 basis points would reduce private shareholding in the PPP to a maximum of
47% of the capital. Therefore, the bigger the spread between interest rates for the public
agent and private investors, the less room there is for negotiation on capital participation
between the parties.
In Apa Nova, Romania, Vivendi holds 84% of the shares (see Table 2). A large participation
of the private sector responded to a lower capital advantage of the public sector, i.e., the
spread between public and private interest rates was smaller than in other countries.
Figure 1 shows the level of the fixed fee as a function of the public-private capital
structure and the interval of efficient public-private financing for the case where rpr/rpu >
1 + J(q)/I(q).
Starting from sole public financing (θ = 0), the fixed fee f(q, θ) increases in θ as a result
of the larger share of the more expensive private capital. For θ < e, the marginal increase
of f(q, θ) equals I(q) · (rprrpu) − J(q) · rpu. At0theta = e, know-how transfer takes place
and f(q, ) dropsby (1e) · J · rpu. For θ ≥ e, f(q, θ) increases at the rate of I(q) · (rprrpu).
Atθa, f(q, θ) equals the fixed fee in a publicly financed project; and at = 1 with private-only
shareholding, the fixed fee equals I(q) · rpr. Therefore, the larger the private share that is
needed for know-how transfer to take place, the smaller the potential savings from private
sector participation.
If the parameter space [e, θa) is not empty, then mixed public-private ownership domi-
nates.
Continuous Knowledge Transfer Scheme
Consider know-how transfer as a continuous, monotonically increasing, and differentiable
function of private shareθ, i.e., private effort increases in private ownership and control rights.
For simplicity, consider the case of linear know-how transfer. Equation 3 can be re-expressed
as:
f(q, θ) = θ · I(q) · rpr + (1− θ) · [I(q)− (1− θ) · J(q)] · rpu (11)
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Figure 1: Interval of efficient public-private financing (discrete model)
where (1θ) · J(q) shows the linear decrease in capital expenditures resulting from know-how
transfer proportional to the private investor’s share.
The first-order condition for an extremum of function 11 with respect to θ is:
δf
δθ
= I(q) · rpr − [I(q) + 2(1− θ) · J(q)] · rpu = 0 (12)
Therefore, f(q, θ) has an extremum at such θ∗ that:
[I(q) + 2(1− θ∗) · J(q)] · rpu = I(q) · rpr (13)
2(1− θ∗) · J(q) =
I(q) · rpr
rpu
− I(q) (14)
θ∗ = 1−
I(q)
2J(q)
(
rpr
rpu
− 1
)
(15)
Since the second derivative of equation 11 with respect to θ is positive for each J(q) > 0,
then equation 15 determines the minimum of function 11.
As θ ranges from zero to one, the condition for θ∗ to be an interior minimum holds for
rpr − rpu > 0 and rpr/rpu − 1 < 2J(q)/I(q).
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Example 2:
Equation 15 can be used to determine the private investor’s optimal shareholding given
expected savings and interest spreads. Assuming the same ratio of expected savings J/I =
.2 as in Example 4 and interest rates applicable to the private sector on average 25%
higher than to the public sector(rpr/rpu = 1.25)
8, function f(q, θ) reaches its minimum at
θ∗ = 0.375. The optimal capital structure would then be a 62.5% capital share owned by
the public agent and 37.5% by the private investor.
Mixed PPP is Pareto-efficient if:
θ∗ · I(q) · rpr + (1− θ
∗)[I(q) + (1− θ∗) · J(q)] · rpu < min{I(q) · rpr; [I(q) + J(q)] · rpu} (16)
For I(q) · rpr < [I(q) + J(q)] · rpu, the private investor’s share θ
∗ results from solving:
θ∗ · I(q) · rpr + (1− θ
∗)[I(q) + (1− θ∗) · J(q)] · rpu < I(q) · rpr (17)
I(q) · rpr − (1− θ
∗) · I(q) · rpr + (1− θ
∗) · I(q) · rpu + (1−
∗)2 · J(q) · rpu < I(q) · rpr (18)
(1− θ∗) · I(q) · (rpr − rpu) + (1− θ
∗)2 · J(q) · rpu < 0 (19)
This condition is met for:
1−
I(q)
J(q)
(
rpr
rpu
− 1
)
< θ∗ < 1 (20)
For I(q) ·rpr ≥ [I(q) + J(q)] · rpu, the private investor’s share θ
∗ must meet the following
condition:
I(q) ·rpr−(1−θ
∗) ·I(q) ·rpr+(1−θ
∗) ·I(q) ·rpu+(1− θ
∗)2 ·J(q) ·rpu < [I(q)+J(q)] ·rpu (21)
− I(q) · (rpu − rpr)− J(q) · rpu + (1− θ
∗) · I(q) · (rpu − rpr) + (1− θ
∗)2 · J(q) · rpu < 0 (22)
This condition is met for:
0 < θ∗ < 2−
I(q)
J(q)
(
rpr
rpu
− 1
)
(23)
For I(q) · rpr ≥ [I(q)+J(q)] · rpu, the private investor’s share θ
∗ must meet the following
condition:
max
[
0; 1−
I(q)
J(q)
(
rpr
rpu
− 1
)]
< θ∗ < min
[
2−
I(q)
J(q)
(
rpr
rpu
− 1
)
; 1
]
(24)
mixed public-private capital will be the efficient form of financing public investments.
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Figure 2: Interval of efficient public-private financing (continuous model)
Example 3:
Expected savings in capital expenditures due to the private sector’s managerial advantage
in existing joint venture partnerships can be inferred from condition (31) colorredesta mal
la ref. In a sample of five public-private water supply and sewage companies in Poland (see
Table 2), θ ranged between .33 and .64. For interest rates 20% higher for the private sector
than for the public sector and assuming that the existing capital structures were optimal,
expected savings in capital expenditures J/(I +J) ranged 12.8 - 23.0%. On average, these
results are similar to savings of 17% in capital expenditures found in British PFI (European
Investment Bank 2004; Bondal 2005).
Figure 2 shows the space for Pareto-efficient public-private partnerships, assuming a
linear decrease in development costs due to private know-how transfer.
Knowledge transfer begins even with a small private share in the shareholding. An
efficient public-private capital structure is achieved in the interval θ ∈ (0, a), where the fixed
fee f(q, θ) is lower than in the cases of solely public or solely private investments. The fixed
fee f(q, θ) achieves its minimum at θ∗. Further increase of θ leads to an increase in f(q, θ)
as a result of the higher share of more expensive private capital. As in Figure 1, at = 1 the
fixed fee equals I(q) · rpr.
5 Concluding Remarks
Efficiency considerations suggest that the ownership of utilities does not have to be dichotom-
ically public or private. In particular cases, efficient investment in public infrastructure re-
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quires mixed public and private ownership and governance of the project. Given very likely
parameters of interest rate spreads between the public and private sectors and potential sav-
ings from private management, the optimum share of private ownership θ∗ is interior and
a public-private capital structure will be more Pareto-efficient - i.e., provide higher quality
for the same fee or lower fee for the same quality - than the solely public or solely private
ownership. Furthermore, the smaller the difference between the interest rate spreads be-
tween the public and private sectors and the larger the savings resulting from private sector
participation, the larger the room for negotiation of capital participation between the parties.
These conclusions have important policy implications. The economic motivations of the
public agent and private investors differ and PPP contracts must be correspondingly designed.
From the public sector’s point of view, the transfer of managerial skills and knowledge that
justifies the private investor’s participation in the SPV should be well defined and secured
in properly drafted and executable legal documents. From the private investor’s point of
view, the lower cost derived from public financing should be secured for the project’s entire
lifespan. This might not be problematic if the project’s funding is provided upfront. However,
if funding is required over the project’s lifetime, the availability of cheaper financing would
imply that the government involved maintains its creditworthiness and, accordingly, follows
sound macroeconomic policies.
Therefore, PPPs may be most efficient in countries whose governments follow stability-
oriented and predictable economic policies that are conducive to securing cheaper financing.
An equally important advantage is a reliable legal system that provides the instruments to
secure the interest of the public agent vis-a`-vis the private investor. A lack of confidence
between the partners, an insufficient legal framework, and the pursuit of other than stability-
oriented macroeconomic policies would undermine the Pareto-efficient solution derived from
the model. If any or all of these conditions are violated, the possible savings achieved with
public-private mixed ownership diminish.
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Table 1: Private participation water and sewerage projects in developing countries by types of
contract and regions
Panel A. Total investments in million of US dollars (number of projects in brackets)
East Asia and
Pacific
Europe and
Central Asia
Latin Amer-
ica and the
Caribbean
Middle East
and North
Africa
South Asia Sub-Saharan
Africa
Total
Concession 8102 (134) 665 (9) 14583 (130) 108 (3) 76 (2) 23535 (278)
Build, rehabilitate, operate,
and transfer
1814 (32) 352 (5) 11268 (83) 99 (2) 31 (1) 13564 (123)
Rehabilitate, lease or rent,
and transfer
0 (0) 29 (1) 133 (3) 9 (1) 171 (5)
Rehabilitate, operate, and
transfer
6288 (102) 284 (3) 3182 (44) 45 (1) 9799 (150)
Divestiture 520 (12) 437 (8) 2255 (12) 3212 (32)
Full 1 (1) 435 (2) 73 (2) 509 (5)
Partial 519 (11) 2 (6) 2182 (10) 2703 (27)
Greenfield project 5176 (224) 1825 (7) 2109 (44) 3202 (11) 245 (4) 133 (2) 12689 (292)
Build, operate, and transfer 4474 (213) 1825 (7) 1965 (38) 2692 (8) 245 (4) 133 (2) 11334 (272)
Build, own, and operate 702 (11) 0 (0) 144 (6) 510 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1356 (20)
Management and lease
contract
126 (14) 1205 (30) 1 (31) 0 (9) 2 (5) 37 (22) 1372 (111)
Lease contract 93 (7) 1205 (20) 0 (17) 37 (10) 1336 (54)
Management contract 33 (7) 0 (10) 1 (14) 0 (9) 2 (5) 0 (12) 36 (57)
Total 13924 (384) 4133 (54) 18948 (217) 3202 (20) 355 (12) 246 (26) 40808 (713)
Panel B. Average percent of private ownership
East Asia and
Pacific
Europe and
Central Asia
Latin Amer-
ica and the
Caribbean
Middle East
and North
Africa
South Asia Sub-Saharan
Africa
Total
Concession 76 75 98 100 100 87
Build, rehabilitate, operate,
and transfer
70 56 98 100 100 90
Rehabilitate, lease or rent,
and transfer
100 83 100 91
Rehabilitate, operate, and
transfer
78 98 98 100 85
Divestiture 49 72 61 60
Full 100 100 100 100
Partial 45 63 54 52
Greenfield project 88 94 99 61 79 75 89
Build, operate, and transfer 89 94 99 63 79 75 89
Build, own, and operate 79 100 57 81
Management and lease
contract
88 93 91 100 84 98 93
Lease contract 79 92 90 95 90
Management contract 100 95 93 100 84 100 96
Total 83 87 95 79 87 96 87
Panel C. Percent of projects with private ownership between 20 and 80 percent
East Asia and
Pacific
Europe and
Central Asia
Latin Amer-
ica and the
Caribbean
Middle East
and North
Africa
South Asia Sub-Saharan
Africa
Total
Concession 49 44 4 0 0 27
Build, rehabilitate, operate,
and transfer
53 80 2 0 0 19
Rehabilitate, lease or rent,
and transfer
0 0 33 0 20
Rehabilitate, operate, and
transfer
48 0 5 0 34
Divestiture 67 50 75 66
Full 0 0 0 0
Partial 73 67 90 78
Greenfield project 23 14 2 82 50 50 22
Build, operate, and transfer 23 14 3 75 50 50 22
Build, own, and operate 27 0 0 100 30
Management and lease
contract
21 13 19 0 20 5 14
Lease contract 43 15 24 10 20
Management contract 0 10 14 0 20 0 7
Total 33 24 10 45 25 8 25
Source: World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database (http://ppi.worldbank.org); retrieved September 2010.
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Table 2: Examples of PPPs with joint public-private capital structures
Company and location Private investors Private investors’ share θ Comments
Panel A: Water companies
AQUA, Bielsko-Biala, Poland United Utilities Europe 21%, and then 33.18% acquiring the shares of an existing company; 12 years
of contractual commitments
Dabrowa Gornicza, Poland RWE Aqua GmbH 34% acquiring the shares of an existing company; 20 years
of contractual commitments
Glogow, Poland Gelsen-Wasser AG 46% acquiring the shares of the existing company
SAUR Neptun, Gdansk,
Poland
SAUR International 51% jv with the city in the operator company; 30 years of
contractual commitments
Tarnowskie Gory/Miasteczko
Slaskie, Poland
Veolia Water (Vivendi) 33.85%; after increasing capi-
talization 64%
25 years of contractual commitments
Stadtentwa¨sserung Schwerte,
Germany
RWE Umwelt Aqua 48% Reported investment costs 12% below the average of
German cities
BerlinWasser, Germany RWE Aqua (16.63%), Allianz
Capital Partners (16.63%),
Veolia Deutshland (16.63%)
49,9%
Scottish Water Solutions, UK Stirling Water (24.5%),
UUGM (24.5)
49% Stirling Water comprises Thames Water, KBR, Al-
fred McAlpine and MJ Gleeson; UUGM is formed by
United Utilities, Galliford Try and Morgan Est
Apa Nova, Rumania Vivendi 84% 25 years of contractual commitments
Panel B: Solid Waste
Mu¨lheimer Entsorgungsge-
sellschaft, Germany
Trienekens 49,0%
Szolnok, Hungary Rethmann 51% 4% ownership by County and a regional association of
municipalities, classified as public sector; Municipal-
ity will retain at least 25% of shares to be considered
qualified minority investor under Hungarian law
Debrecen, Hungary ASA 51% Municipality will retain at least 25% of shares to be
considered qualified minority investor under Hungar-
ian law
Varna, Bulgaria RWE 65%
Kirklees, UK United Waste Services 81% 25 years of contractual commitments
Panel C: Airports
Charles De Gaulle Airport,
Paris, France
Free float (29.6%), employees
(2%)
31,60% Schiphol Group owns 8% of Paris CDG, a consortium
of: State of Netherlands (69.8%), City of Amsterdam
(20%), Ae´roports de Paris (8%) and City of Rotter-
dam (2.2%), classified as a public entityand City of
Rotterdam (2.2%), I classified it as a public entity
International Airport Ham-
burg, Germany
Hochtief AirPort, Aer Rianta
International
initially 36%, then 40%
Local Airport Kassel-Calden,
Germany
IHK (chamber of commerce),
FRAPORT (Transportation
Company)
50%
Flughafen Dusserldof, Ger-
many
HTA (20%), HTAC (10%),
Aer Rianta (20%)
50% acquiring the shares of the existing company
Frankfurt Airport, Germany Stadtwerke Frankfurt am
Main Holding GmbH
(20.16%), Julius Bar Hold-
ing AG (10.35%), Deutsche
Lufthansa AG (9.94%), others
(27.98%)
68,43% partial IPO to wide range of investors
Source: Moszoro (2005), European Commission and Others (2004), Weber and Alfen (2010).
Table 3: Add caption
Statistic Corporate
Bonds (%)
Municipal
Bonds (%)
Treasury
Bonds (%)
C-M Bond
Yields Spread
(%)
C/M Bond
Yields Ratio
C-T Bond
Yields Spread
(%)
C/T Bond
Yields Ratio
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]=[2]-[3] [6]=[2]/[3] [7]=[2]-[4] [8]=[2]/[4]
Minimum 4,44 3,15 2,22 0,62 1,16 0,25 1,05
Maximum 6,82 4,40 5,03 2,42 1,72 2,85 2,15
Mean 5,18 3,74 3,93 1,44 1,39 1,25 1,37
Median 5,15 3,80 3,96 1,34 1,36 1,13 1,29
Std. Deviation 0,41 0,30 0,70 0,41 0,13 0,80 0,30
Source: Reuters.
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